SPIRE Setup Documentation

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by Lisa

Overview

This setup deploys SPIRE as follows:

  • SPIRE Server on <SPIRE_SERVER_HOST>
  • SPIRE Agent on <SPIRE_AGENT_HOST>
  • Trust domain: <TRUST_DOMAIN>
  • Server/agent communication port: <SERVER_PORT>/tcp

How it works

SPIRE provides machine and workload identity.

The SPIRE Server on <SPIRE_SERVER_HOST> is the trust authority for the trust domain <TRUST_DOMAIN>.

The SPIRE Agent on <SPIRE_AGENT_HOST> attests to the server using x509pop with an X.509 certificate issued by an enterprise/internal CA.

Applications on <SPIRE_AGENT_HOST> do not talk directly to the SPIRE Server. They talk to the local SPIRE Agent over the local workload API socket <AGENT_SOCKET_PATH>.

The agent returns an X.509-SVID representing the workload identity.

Installation Instructions

  1. Install SPIRE binaries

Run on both hosts:

mkdir -p /opt/spire
cd /tmp
wget https://github.com/spiffe/spire/releases/download/v1.15.2/spire-1.15.2-linux-amd64-musl.tar.gz
tar zxf spire-1.15.2-linux-amd64-musl.tar.gz
cp -r spire-1.15.2/. /opt/spire/

On the SPIRE Server host:

ln -sf /opt/spire/bin/spire-server /usr/bin/spire-server

On the SPIRE Agent host:

ln -sf /opt/spire/bin/spire-agent /usr/bin/spire-agent

  1. Configure SPIRE Server

Create directories:

mkdir -p /opt/spire/conf
mkdir -p /opt/spire/data/server
mkdir -p /opt/spire/conf/x509pop

Place the CA bundle at:

/opt/spire/conf/x509pop/bundle.pem

Contents:

—–BEGIN CERTIFICATE—–
<REDACTED CA CERTIFICATE>
—–END CERTIFICATE—–
—–BEGIN CERTIFICATE—–
<REDACTED CA CERTIFICATE>
—–END CERTIFICATE—–
—–BEGIN CERTIFICATE—–
<REDACTED CA CERTIFICATE>
—–END CERTIFICATE—–

Create /opt/spire/conf/server.conf:

server {
bind_address = “0.0.0.0”
bind_port = “<SERVER_PORT>”
trust_domain = “<TRUST_DOMAIN>”
data_dir = “/opt/spire/data/server”
log_level = “INFO”
}

plugins {
DataStore “sql” {
plugin_data {
database_type = “sqlite3”
connection_string = “/opt/spire/data/server/datastore.sqlite3”
}
}

NodeAttestor “x509pop” {
plugin_data {
ca_bundle_path = “/opt/spire/conf/x509pop/bundle.pem”
}
}

KeyManager “memory” {
plugin_data {}
}
}

health_checks {
listener_enabled = true
bind_address = “127.0.0.1”
bind_port = “<HEALTH_PORT>”
}

Create /etc/systemd/system/spire-server.service:

[Unit]
Description=SPIRE Server
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target

[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/opt/spire/bin/spire-server run -config /opt/spire/conf/server.conf
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
LimitNOFILE=65536

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

Start server:

systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable –now spire-server
systemctl status spire-server –no-pager

Validate server:

spire-server healthcheck

  1. Configure SPIRE Agent

Create directories:

mkdir -p /opt/spire/conf
mkdir -p /opt/spire/data/agent
mkdir -p /opt/spire/sockets
mkdir -p /opt/spire/conf/x509pop

Issue a certificate through your enterprise PKI platform. Download as OpenSSL format and split CRT/KEY files. Copy the node certificate to:

/opt/spire/conf/x509pop/agent.crt

Copy the node private key to:

/opt/spire/conf/x509pop/agent.key

The private key must be unencrypted PEM.

Set permissions:

chmod 700 /opt/spire/conf/x509pop
chmod 600 /opt/spire/conf/x509pop/agent.key
chmod 644 /opt/spire/conf/x509pop/agent.crt

Create /opt/spire/conf/agent.conf:

agent {
data_dir = “/opt/spire/data/agent”
log_level = “INFO”
trust_domain = “<TRUST_DOMAIN>”
server_address = “<SPIRE_SERVER_HOST>”
server_port = “<SERVER_PORT>”
socket_path = “<AGENT_SOCKET_PATH>”
insecure_bootstrap = true
}

plugins {
KeyManager “disk” {
plugin_data {
directory = “/opt/spire/data/agent”
}
}

WorkloadAttestor “unix” {
plugin_data {}
}

NodeAttestor “x509pop” {
plugin_data {
private_key_path = “/opt/spire/conf/x509pop/agent.key”
certificate_path = “/opt/spire/conf/x509pop/agent.crt”
}
}
}

Create /etc/systemd/system/spire-agent.service:

[Unit]
Description=SPIRE Agent
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target

[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/opt/spire/bin/spire-agent run -config /opt/spire/conf/agent.conf
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
LimitNOFILE=65536

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

Start agent:

systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable –now spire-agent
systemctl status spire-agent –no-pager

  1. Validate x509pop agent attestation

On the SPIRE Server host:

spire-server agent list

Expected result:

  • Agent attestation type is x509pop
  • Can re-attest is true
  • Parent ID format resembles:

spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/spire/agent/x509pop/<AGENT_HASH>

  1. Create workload registration entry

Use the current x509pop agent SPIFFE ID from spire-server agent list.

On the SPIRE Server host:

spire-server entry create \
-spiffeID spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/workload/<WORKLOAD_NAME> \
-parentID spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/spire/agent/x509pop/<AGENT_HASH> \
-selector unix:uid:0

This authorizes a root-owned process on the SPIRE Agent host.

  1. Fetch workload identity on the SPIRE Agent host

/opt/spire/bin/spire-agent api fetch x509 -socketPath <AGENT_SOCKET_PATH>

Expected SPIFFE ID:

spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/workload/<WORKLOAD_NAME>

  1. Write certs to disk for testing

Create destination directory:

mkdir -p /etc/spire/svid/test
chmod 700 /etc/spire/svid/test

Write files:

/opt/spire/bin/spire-agent api fetch x509 \
-socketPath <AGENT_SOCKET_PATH> \
-write /etc/spire/svid/test

Inspect output:

ls -l /etc/spire/svid/test

openssl x509 -in /etc/spire/svid/test/svid.0.pem -text -noout

  1. Reboot persistence validation

Reboot the SPIRE Agent host.

After reboot, validate:

systemctl status spire-agent –no-pager

ls -l <AGENT_SOCKET_PATH>

/opt/spire/bin/spire-agent api fetch x509 -socketPath <AGENT_SOCKET_PATH>

Expected behavior:

  • spire-agent starts automatically
  • Workload API socket exists
  • X.509-SVID fetch succeeds
  1. Operational notes
  • Current architecture: <SPIRE_SERVER_HOST> = SPIRE Server; <SPIRE_AGENT_HOST> = SPIRE Agent
  • Current trust domain: <TRUST_DOMAIN>
  • Current server/agent path: <SPIRE_AGENT_HOST> to <SPIRE_SERVER_HOST> on TCP <SERVER_PORT>
  • Current Workload API socket: <AGENT_SOCKET_PATH>
  • Current example workload selector: unix:uid:0
  • Current example workload identity: spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/workload/<WORKLOAD_NAME>

JWT

Create JWT registration on the SPIRE Server host:

spire-server entry create \
-spiffeID spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/workload/<JWT_WORKLOAD_NAME> \
-parentID spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/spire/agent/x509pop/<AGENT_HASH> \
-selector unix:uid:0

Fetch JWT-SVID from the SPIRE Agent host:

/opt/spire/bin/spire-agent api fetch jwt \
-socketPath <AGENT_SOCKET_PATH> \
-audience <JWT_AUDIENCE> \
-spiffeID spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/workload/<JWT_WORKLOAD_NAME>

Example output:

token(spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/workload/<JWT_WORKLOAD_NAME>):
<REDACTED JWT-SVID>

bundle(spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>):
<REDACTED JWKS BUNDLE>

SPIRE OIDC Discovery Provider

On the SPIRE Server host:

mkdir -p /opt/spire-extras
cd /tmp
wget https://github.com/spiffe/spire/releases/download/v1.15.2/spire-extras-1.15.2-linux-amd64-musl.tar.gz
tar zxf spire-extras-1.15.2-linux-amd64-musl.tar.gz
cp -r spire-extras-1.15.2/ /opt/spire-extras/

ln -sf /opt/spire-extras/bin/oidc-discovery-provider /usr/bin/oidc-discovery-provider
mkdir -p /opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider

Create certificate and key files:

/opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider/tls.crt
/opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider/tls.key

Set permissions:

chmod 644 /opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider/tls.crt
chmod 600 /opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider/tls.key

Create /opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider/oidc-discovery-provider.conf:

log_level = “INFO”

domains = [“<OIDC_DISCOVERY_DOMAIN>”]

server_api {
address = “unix://<SPIRE_SERVER_API_SOCKET>”
}

serving_cert_file {
cert_file_path = “/opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider/tls.crt”
key_file_path = “/opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider/tls.key”
}

Create /etc/systemd/system/spire-oidc-discovery-provider.service:

[Unit]
Description=SPIRE OIDC Discovery Provider
After=network-online.target spire-server.service
Wants=network-online.target

[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/opt/spire-extras/bin/oidc-discovery-provider -config /opt/spire-extras/conf/oidc-discovery-provider/oidc-discovery-provider.conf
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
LimitNOFILE=65536

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

Ping Integration

PingFederate Integration Note for SPIRE JWT Validation

Purpose

Configure PingFederate to trust and validate JWTs issued from the SPIRE environment.

SPIRE issuer details

Use these values:

  • Issuer: https://<OIDC_DISCOVERY_DOMAIN>
  • OIDC discovery URL: https://<OIDC_DISCOVERY_DOMAIN>/.well-known/openid-configuration
  • JWKS URL: https://<OIDC_DISCOVERY_DOMAIN>/keys

Trust model

PingFederate should validate JWT signatures using the JWKS published by the SPIRE OIDC Discovery Provider.

Ping does not need to call the SPIRE server directly for every token validation. It should use the discovery/JWKS metadata from the OIDC Discovery Provider.

Expected JWT characteristics

Issuer

Ping should require:

iss = https://<OIDC_DISCOVERY_DOMAIN>

Audience

Recommended audience value:

<PING_AUDIENCE>

Clients requesting JWT-SVIDs from SPIRE should request them with this audience.

Subject

The workload identity will be in:

sub

Example:

spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/workload/<WORKLOAD_NAME>

This is the primary identity claim Ping should use to identify the calling workload.

Recommended validation rules in Ping

Validate:

  • JWT signature against SPIRE JWKS
  • iss matches https://<OIDC_DISCOVERY_DOMAIN>
  • aud contains <PING_AUDIENCE>
  • token is within validity window (exp, iat)
  • sub is an allowed SPIFFE ID or matches allowed policy rules

Example workload identity currently in use

Current example SPIFFE ID:

spiffe://<TRUST_DOMAIN>/workload/<WORKLOAD_NAME>

Client-side JWT retrieval model

A workload on the SPIRE Agent host should obtain its JWT from the local SPIRE agent, not from the SPIRE server directly.

Local agent socket:

<AGENT_SOCKET_PATH>

Example operational flow

  1. Workload on the SPIRE Agent host requests a JWT-SVID from the local SPIRE agent.
  2. JWT-SVID is issued with:
  • issuer = https://<OIDC_DISCOVERY_DOMAIN>
  • audience = <PING_AUDIENCE>
  • subject = workload SPIFFE ID
  1. Workload presents JWT to PingFederate.
  2. PingFederate validates the JWT using SPIRE OIDC discovery/JWKS.
  3. PingFederate maps the SPIFFE workload identity to access policy, token issuance, or downstream application authorization.

Suggested placeholder legend

| Placeholder | Meaning |
|—|—|

| <SPIRE_SERVER_HOST> | SPIRE server hostname |

| <SPIRE_AGENT_HOST> | SPIRE agent hostname |

| <TRUST_DOMAIN> | SPIRE trust domain |

| <SERVER_PORT> | SPIRE server listener port |

| <HEALTH_PORT> | Health check port |

| <AGENT_SOCKET_PATH> | Local SPIRE Agent workload API socket |

| <AGENT_HASH> | x509pop parent/agent hash |

| <WORKLOAD_NAME> | Example X.509 workload name |

| <JWT_WORKLOAD_NAME> | Example JWT workload name |

| <JWT_AUDIENCE> | JWT audience used by client |

| <PING_AUDIENCE> | Audience PingFederate validates |

| <OIDC_DISCOVERY_DOMAIN> | Public/abstracted OIDC issuer hostname |

| <SPIRE_SERVER_API_SOCKET> | SPIRE server private API socket |

 

Flatpak – Escaping the Sandbox

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by Lisa

We’ve been running Cura from a flatpak because the rpm distributed version was out of date. The big drawback, though, is that this flatpak could not see the files from network mounts. The mount is fine – in fstab, same user account can interact with those files in other applications. Just not this flatpak thing.

Turns out that’s normal – flatpaks operate in a sort of sandbox. You just have to tell it to let an individual flatpak access the location where the network mounts are. In this case, the /mnt path:

flatpack override com.ultimaker.cura --filesystem=/mnt

MiniPlasma Mitigation

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by Lisa

Microsoft Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (alternately referred to as MiniPlasma) is one of those findings that is a little confusing. The vulnerability appears tied to an issue Microsoft originally addressed in 2020, which raises the obvious question: if it was already patched, why is it relevant again now?

The original fix may have closed a specific exploitation path without fully eliminating the underlying bug class. The remediation may have been incomplete. Or a later code change may have reintroduced a previously fixed condition. Without updated vendor detail, it is hard to say exactly which of those happened; but the operational conclusion is the same: a system can still be exposed today even if the original 2020 patch was installed.

For environments looking for a practical mitigation, the good news is that many servers do not need Windows Cloud Files functionality at all. The vulnerable component is the Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver (CldFlt), which supports placeholder and hydration behavior used by features such as OneDrive Files On-Demand and other CfAPI-based integrations.

That makes CldFlt a viable mitigation target. If the filter is loaded but not attached to any volumes, there is a good chance it can be safely unloaded and disabled. This does not remove the driver from disk, but it does remove the active kernel attack surface associated with the running minifilter. Since this is an elevation-of-privilege issue, that distinction matters: the goal is not to claim the file no longer exists, but to prevent the vulnerable driver from being active in the system.

The following process checks whether any volumes are associated with CldFlt, temporarily unloads the filter, verifies that the system continues functioning normally, and then disables the driver persistently.

REM Check instances on CldFlt — if 0, proceed with testing disablement
fltmc filters

REM Example output:
REM Filter Name Num Instances Altitude Frame
REM —————————— ————- ———— —–
REM bindflt 0 409800 0
REM MsSecFlt 9 385600 0
REM CSAgent 9 321410.78870 0
REM storqosflt 0 244000 0
REM wcifs 0 189900 0
REM CldFlt 0 180451 0
REM FileCrypt 0 141100 0
REM UnionFS 0 130850 0
REM npsvctrig 1 46000 0
REM Wof 1 40700 0

REM Unload cldflt
fltmc unload cldflt

REM Verify stopped
sc query cldflt

REM Verify no longer in filters list
fltmc filters

REM Verify applications and expected file operations still work normally
REM If everything looks good, disable persistent startup
sc config cldflt start= disabled

Fedora 43 to 44 upgrade: dnf5 plugin load failure after upgrade

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by Lisa

After completing an in-place upgrade from Fedora 43 to Fedora 44, dnf5 failed to run with this error:

[lisa@fedora05 ~]# dnf5 update
Cannot load dnf5 plugin: /usr/lib64/dnf5/plugins/automatic_cmd_plugin.so
Cannot load shared library “/usr/lib64/dnf5/plugins/automatic_cmd_plugin.so”: libdnf5-cli.so.2: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

What happened

The Fedora 44 upgrade completed, and the installed dnf5 packages were all current Fedora 44 versions. However, there was a leftover plugin file still sitting in /usr/lib64/dnf5/plugins/automatic_cmd_plugin.so.

That file was not owned by any RPM package and had been built against an older library, libdnf5-cli.so.2.

But Fedora 44 had /usr/lib64/libdnf5-cli.so.3.

dnf5 was trying to load a stale plugin from before the upgrade.

How I verified it

These commands showed the problem:

ls -l /usr/lib64/libdnf5-cli.so*
rpm -qf /usr/lib64/dnf5/plugins/automatic_cmd_plugin.so
ldd /usr/lib64/dnf5/plugins/automatic_cmd_plugin.so

Results:

  • libdnf5-cli.so.3 existed
  • automatic_cmd_plugin.so was not owned by any package
  • ldd showed it was looking for libdnf5-cli.so.2

Fix

Remove the orphaned plugin file:

rm /usr/lib64/dnf5/plugins/automatic_cmd_plugin.so
ldconfig
dnf5 update

After deleting the stale plugin, dnf5 worked normally again.

Root cause

This appears to be a leftover orphaned dnf5 plugin from before the major version upgrade. Even though the main dnf5 and libdnf5 packages were updated correctly, dnf5 still tried to load the old .so file it found in the plugins directory.

Kafbat – OAUTH With RBAC

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by Lisa

I encountered a challenge with a Kafka management tool — it supports SSO, and I was able to get an OAUTH connection set up to control what users could see when logging in through the UI, but the API component didn’t extract information from the bearer token and there was nothing in the rbac mapping to allow the bearer-token client ID to access anything.

Updates to allow the /api components to be authenticated by simple bearer tokens and a client ID mapped into a role are at https://github.com/ljr55555/kafka-ui

AuthorizationController.java was updated to properly support non-browser, machine-principal auth.

Added/fixed:

  • avoids null failure when authentication.getName() is missing
  • resolves principal name from alternate attributes such as:
    • client_id
    • sub
    • username
  • updated displayed permissions logic so /api/authorization uses the same effective RBAC matching idea as the backend

Result

/api/authorization now works for bearer-token API callers and shows:

  • username = client ID
  • populated permissions list

AccessControlService.java

Added support for API bearer-token principals

Previously, getUser() only worked when the authenticated principal was a RbacUser, which covered the browser/user flow.

Now it can also derive an AuthenticatedUser from opaque-token authenticated principals by extracting:

  • principal name
  • group-like values from attributes/authorities if present

Updated role matching logic

Previously, role matching was only role name matches one of user.groups(). Now it also supports role name matches user.principal(). That enables RBAC binding directly to the API client ID.

Result

RBAC now works for:

  • normal browser users via groups
  • API bearer-token callers via client principal name

DynamicConfigMapper.java

Fixed a mapper bug.

Before

The method mapping resource server config created a populated OAuth2ResourceServerProperties result object but always returned null.

After

It now returns result.

Result

Dynamic/config mapping for resource-server settings no longer silently discards the mapped object.

Build/package note

To preserve the browser UI, the jar needs to be built with frontend included — which you know if you read the doc … or you take my route, start it all up, test the API successfully, and then get baffled that the user UI throws 


        bash./gradlew clean assemble -Pinclude-frontend=true

application.yml

server:
  port: 8443
  ssl:
    enabled: true
    key-store: file:/etc/kafkaui/certs/kafbat.rushworth.us.p12
    key-store-password: ${KEYSTORE_PASSWORD}
    key-store-type: PKCS12
    key-alias: kafbat

auth:
  type: OAUTH2
  oauth2:
    client:
      pingfed:
        client-id: ${OAUTH_CLIENT_ID}
        client-secret: ${OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET}
        scope:
          - openid
          - profile
          - email
        client-name: oauthclient
        provider: oauthclient
        redirect-uri: https://kafbat.rushworth.us:8443/login/oauth2/code/oauthclient
        authorization-grant-type: authorization_code
        issuer-uri: https://login.example.com
        jwk-set-uri: https://login.example.com/pf/JWKS
        authorization-uri: https://login.example.com/as/authorization.oauth2
        token-uri: https://login.example.com/as/token.oauth2
        user-info-uri: https://login.example.com/idp/userinfo.openid
        user-name-attribute: username
        custom-params:
          type: oauth
          roles-field: memberOf

    resource-server:
      opaque-token:
        client-id: ${OAUTH_CLIENT_ID}
        client-secret: ${OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET}
        introspection-uri: https://login.example.com/as/introspect.oauth2

kafka:
  clusters:
    - name: test
      bootstrapServers: ${KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS}

roles.yml

rbac:
  roles:
    - name: "admins"
      clusters:
        - test
      subjects:
        - provider: oauth
          type: role
          value: "CN=KafbatAdmins,OU=SecurityGroups,DC=example,DC=com"
      permissions:
        - resource: applicationconfig
          actions: all

        - resource: clusterconfig
          actions: all

        - resource: topic
          value: ".*"
          actions: all

        - resource: consumer
          value: ".*"
          actions: all

        - resource: schema
          value: ".*"
          actions: all

        - resource: connect
          value: ".*"
          actions: all

        - resource: ksql
          actions: all

        - resource: acl
          actions: [ view ]

    - name: "${OAUTH_CLIENT_ID}"
      clusters:
        - test
      subjects:
        - provider: oauth
          type: user
          value: "${OAUTH_CLIENT_ID}"
      permissions:
        - resource: applicationconfig
          actions: all

        - resource: clusterconfig
          actions: all

        - resource: topic
          value: ".*"
          actions: all

        - resource: consumer
          value: ".*"
          actions: all

        - resource: schema
          value: ".*"
 
        - resource: connect
          value: ".*"
          actions: all

        - resource: ksql
          actions: all

        - resource: acl
          actions: [ view ]

docker-compose.yml

services:
  redpanda:
    image: redpandadata/redpanda:v25.1.2
    container_name: redpanda
    command:
      - redpanda
      - start
      - --overprovisioned
      - --smp=1
      - --memory=1G
      - --reserve-memory=0M
      - --node-id=0
      - --check=false
      - --kafka-addr=PLAINTEXT://0.0.0.0:9092
      - --advertise-kafka-addr=PLAINTEXT://redpanda:9092
    ports:
      - "9092:9092"

  kafbat-ui:
    image: ghcr.io/kafbat/kafka-ui:latest
    container_name: kafbat-ui
    restart: unless-stopped
    depends_on:
      - redpanda
    ports:
      - "8443:8443"
    volumes:
      - ./config/application.yml:/etc/kafkaui/application.yml:ro
      - ./config/roles.yml:/etc/kafkaui/roles.yml:ro
      - ./certs:/etc/kafkaui/certs:ro
    environment:
      SPRING_CONFIG_LOCATION: file:/etc/kafkaui/application.yml
      SPRING_CONFIG_ADDITIONAL_LOCATION: file:/etc/kafkaui/roles.yml
      KEYSTORE_PASSWORD: REDACTED
      OAUTH_CLIENT_ID: REDACTED
      OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET: REDACTED
      KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: redpanda:9092

Docker for Java Builds

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by Lisa

Instead of flipping back and forth between java versions for various builds, you can just use a docker container for the proper Java version to run the build. 

[lisa@docker kafka-ui]# docker run --rm -it   --user $(id -u):$(id -g)   -v "$PWD":/workspace   -w /workspace   eclipse-temurin:25   bash -lc './gradlew clean build'
Downloading https://services.gradle.org/distributions/gradle-9.2.0-bin.zip
............10%.............20%.............30%.............40%.............50%.............60%.............70%.............80%.............90%.............100%

Welcome to Gradle 9.2.0!

Here are the highlights of this release:
 - Windows ARM support
 - Improved publishing APIs
 - Better guidance for dependency verification failures

For more details see https://docs.gradle.org/9.2.0/release-notes.html

Starting a Gradle Daemon (subsequent builds will be faster)
<=============> 100% CONFIGURING [1m 46s]
> Resolve dependencies of :api:detachedConfiguration273